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COMMENTS
THE UNWELCOM INVOLUNTARY GUEST
JOHN W RICHARDS* AND ROBERT VENABLE
"One swallow," the old saw has it, "does not make a summer," and
by the same token experience teaches that one decision of the Wash-
ington court by no means makes a rule. On this premise it may well be
that nothing should be said about Akms v. Hemphill;' immured
within its own unique facts, its implications lost for that very reason
to him who runs casting for a "case in point," it might survive simply
as a sport, never to work a mutation of its own small cosmos. Yet the
seed of change is there; sprouting, it could shift the entire approach of
the court to guest statute problems. It is the purpose of this comment
to discuss whether such a shift should be made.
The facts of the case are as spare and clean cut as though invented
to raise its issue. Joyce Akins, sixteen, was invited by Robbie Hemphill
to ride with him in his car; it was not until they had proceeded some
*Professor of Law, University of Washington.
'33 Wn.(2d) 735, 207 P.(2d) 195 (1949).
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way on their journey that she discovered he was intoxicated and driv-
ing in an incressingly reckless manner. Frightened, she demanded
repeatedly to be let out; he heard, refused, increased his speed, and
presently collided with the rear of another car to Joyce's severe and
permanent injury A general demurrer to her complaint was sustained
and upon her refusal to plead further judgment was entered dismissing
her action. This judgment was affirmed en banc on appeal.
It is a clear guest statute problem, uncontaminated by any sugges-
tion of contributory negligence or assumption of risk, and, since on
demurrer, without the usual controversy over the facts. It offers an
unparalleled opportunity for an analysis of the host-guest relationship,
a thoughtful probing into the background and purposes of the statute
itself. Instead, the majority opinion is content to rest upon authority-
we are committed (to the rule) that when she became a guest of
the respondent driver, she became one for the entire journey, and did
not terminate the host-guest relationship by her demands."' This is a
neat and economical solution, but to make it also an acceptable one
it is necessary to inquire into the matter of whether the court is in fact
committed to the rule it cites, and secondly, even if it is so committed,
whether that rule is a sensible one.
As to the first matter, there can scarcely be room for difference of
opinion. Taylor v. Taug,2 the case relied upon, may have done a num-
ber of different things, but among them it certainly did not "commit"
the court to any such rule as that for which it is cited. The rule as there
stated is obiter dictum in the purest sense: not only is it unnecessary
to, and not relied on, in the decision of the case, but it relates to an
'issue which was never raised by the evidence, the opinion specifically
pointing out that "there was a total failure of proof that the driver
heard the statement or that he refused any request made by. his guest."
2 Id. at 738.
8 17 Wn. (2d) 533, 136 P. (2d) 176 (1943) Plaintiff was a guest in a car driven by
defendant, whom she knew had been drinking beer; alarmed at his speed, she requested-
to be let out; there was a dispute as to whether the request was heard, in any event
nothing was done and the driver shortly lost control of the car to plaintiff's injury.
Judgment of dismissal was affirmed on the twin grounds of assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence, predicated on the fact that plaintiff was aware that the driver
had taken some beer before starting out. The result may be supported on the basis of
three assumptions as to the facts, which the dissenting judges thought rather violent:(1) that the driver was drunk; (2) that the plaintiff knew it; and (3) that the drunk-
enness caused him to lose control. The court seems to adopt the somewhat remarkable
rule that it is contributory negligence to ride with a driver who has been drinking,
without regard to what he drank, the amount, the extent to which his abilities to drive
were affected, or that the injury might not in fact have been caused by the drinking
at all. The case is discussed in 24 WAsH. L. REv., 105-107 (1949).
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Stripped thus of authority, it must have been the reasomng behind
the dictum in the Taylor case which led the court in Akins v. Hemphill
to adopt it without argument. Just how persuasive is that reasomng?
Here it is, in outline:'
1. After quoting the guest statute and remarking that its manifest
purpose was to prevent collusive suits in fraud of insurance com-
panies, the court characterizes the host-guest relationship as being
gratuitous, and consensual though not contractual.
2. Appellant's argument is stated to the effect that the relationship,
and hence the host's immunity under the statute, terminated when
appellant asked to be let out of the car, and the driver refused.
3. Blanchard v. Ogletree' is summarized, apparently in a quotation
from appellant's brief, the court there holding that the jury should
have been instructed that if they found that the passenger had re-
quested to be let out, and had been refused, then the legal relationship
of host-guest had changed, and when the passenger ceased to be the
voluntary and gratuitous guest of the defendant, he would thereupon
be bound to exercise ordinary care for her safety (The applicable
guest statute made liability hinge on gross negligence.)
4. "We are unable to agree with appellant's argument or the reason-
ing of the cited case."
5. Parker v. Taylor' is quoted to the effect that a guest assumes the
risk of all injuries, except those intentionally caused by the owner or
driver, and the opinion then remarks that there was no showing of
intentional injury here.
6. The cases in which protest or failure to protest the way. in which
a car was being driven, on the issue of contributory negligence, are
cited, and the court remarks that it had never held, nor intended to
hold, that such protests affected the host-guest relationship.
7 "The contention of appellant is answered by the quotation from
Parker v. Taylor, supra, which we have set out. When appellant
4 Ibid., 537-539.
541 Ga. App. 4, 152 S.E. 116 (1930). Curiously enough, this seems to be the only
case, other than the one subject to our discussion, in which the effect of a request-and-
refusal on the guest status has been raised.
6 196 Wash. 22, 81 P.(2d) 806 (1938) Defendant speeded up his car as he
approached a hump in the road, to give his nephews in the back seat a thrill by bounc-
ing them in the air; his sister, riding with them, suffered a broken back. Held. No
liability under the the guest statute in the absence of a showing that the snjury was
intended, the court unfortunately summing up by a statement to the effect that under
the statute, a guest "assumes the risk" of all injuries except those intentionally inflicted
by the driver-an expression which may describe the effect of the statute, but is cer-
tainly not an accurate explanation of its operation.
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accepted a ride with respondent, she became a guest for the entire
journey To hold otherwise would nullify the plain wording and intent
of the host-guest statute."
Aside from numbers 4 and 7, it is apparent that there is not even
the semblance of an argument in support of the rule. Number 4 is
simply a flat rejection. As to number 7, it is submitted with all due
deference that appellant's contention is not even touched, let alone
answered, by Parker v. Taylor; that case dealt solely with the effect
of the statute when the host-guest relationship was established; it did
not, and indeed could not, conceivably apply to the problem of whether
the relationship existed at all. As to the statement that a contrary
holding "would nullify the plain wording and intent" of the statute-
the argument seems finally to come down to this-something more
must be said.
The statute" provides that no person transported by the owner or
operator of a motor vehicle as an invited guest or licensee without pay-
ment for such transportation shall have a cause of action in case of
accident unless such accident shall have been intentional. Surely it is
a curious usage to say that the statute is "nullified" by a finding that
a passenger is not a guest within its terms, a process which has been
going on in numerous cases since the statute was first enacted in 1933.
Is it then the "plain wording" which is nullified? It would seem to be
just the other way around: the "plain wording" is nullified every time
the courts hold a person to be within the statute who should properly
be found to be without. Certainly there is nothing in the statute,
"plain" or otherwise, to indicate that a person who becomes a guest
must continue to be one; indeed, the characterization of the host-guest
relationship at the beginning of the opinion as being consensual though
not contractual carries with it by necessary implication the require-
ment that it is terminable at will by either party And so far as nullify-
ing the "intent" of the statute is concerned, he who runs may read in
its "plain wording" what that intent is: to prevent a guest or licensee
without payment for transportation to recover for anything short of a
battery by the driver or owner. This seems somewhat different from an
intent to prevent someone who is not a guest from.recovering for ordi-
nary negligence.
What the court has done in adopting the so-called rule of the Taylor
case is to breed, by Akins out of Taylor, a creature surely anomalous
7 REe. REV. STAT. § 6360-121 [P.P.C. § 295-95]. The paraphrase is sufficiently accu-
rate for the discussion.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
and possibly monstrous: the involuntary guest. It is hard to believe
that had defendant abducted plaintiff m the first place she would be
treated as his guest; it is equally hard to believe there was any less of
an abduction when, heedless of her requests, he forced her to accom-
pany him in the car. What would the court have done had plaintiff
brought her action on the theory of false imprisonment, her injuries
being named as consequential damages; could it then conceivably
have found her consent to be irrevocable? What possible reason can
there be for this unhappy contretemps?
The answer is to be found in the majority opinions of neither the
Taylor nor the Akzns cases, but is very likely disclosed in the con-
curring opinion in the latter case written by Justice Hill. At long last
the court will not merely talk about the public policy back of the guest
statute, it will do something about it: it will eliminate the possibility
of rampant collusion between passenger and driver in fraud of insur-
ance carriers by keeping from the jury any case in which the host-
guest relationship is in issue. True, Justice Hill does not in terms go so
far. "To announce any other rule than that adhered to by the majority,"
he says, "would again make a jury question out of any host-guest case
in which the plaintiff would testify, truly or falsely, that he or she had
attempted to terminate the host-guest relationship prior to the acci-
dent."' But can he or the court in reason stop there, with that little
case? What possible difference can there be, in fact or theory, between
the problem of the inception of the relationship and the problem of its
termination, between-to be specific-joint adventure, "payment"
under the Syverson ° and Fuller" rules, and termination by request as
in the Akzns situation?1" It is as easy to rig one kind of a case as
S This was the situation in Cieplinsks v. Severn, 269 Mass. 261, 168 N.E. 722(1929), noted, 10 B. U. L. Ray. 263 Plaintiff, a hitch-hiker, recovered for injuries
suffered in attempting to escape from defendant's car after he refused to let her out, on
the theory of false imprisonment. Compare Griffin v. Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P. (2d)
297 (1935) Plaintiff was induced to enter the car against her will by the fact that
defendants put her handbag in it; held false imprisonment, and her injuries in a subse-
quent collision recoverable as consequential damages.
9 Supra note 1 at page 739.
10 Syverson v. Berg, 194 Wash. 86, 77 P.(2d) 382 (1938) the "payment" referred
to in the statute must amount to a "business advantage or material consideration"
accruing to the host as the result of the transportation.
"Fuller v. Tucker, 4' Wn.(2d) 426, 103 P.(2d) 1086 (1940) The formula as to
"payment" is elaborated, there must be "(1) an actual or potential benefit in a
material or business sense resulting or to result to the owner, and (2) that the trans-
portation be motivated by the expectation of such benefit."
1The difficulty of drawing a distinction between the inception problem and the
termination problem is illustrated in Parrish v. Ash, 32 Wn. (2d) 637, 203 P. (2d) 330
(1949) Plaintiff insisted that she was not a guest in defendant's car because she had
paid ten cents for the ride, defendant asserted that the payment was not for the ride,
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another in tins field, and indeed the chances, by actual count, of collu-
sion running rampant are so far thirty-six to one in the inception as
opposed to the termination problem; if the court feels the need of a
drastic remedy in the one, so much more should it apply it in the other.
There can be no half measures; let the court once become entangled
in an attempt to separate cases for trial on the basis of credibility of
testimony (particularly without having heard it, as in the Akrns case)
and confusion will reign supreme. It is a strong solution, but as Justice
Hill points out, "the legislature in effect said that it is better that there
be an occasional injustice than a wholesale perversion of justice."' 8
Perhaps a somewhat more even balance could be struck were the
court actually to grapple with the fundamentals of the problem. If it
is fraudulent collusion against insurers that is to be prevented, why
should the court ignore the simple, the obvious, the decisive test: does
the defendant have insurance? If he does not, there can be no collusion,
and the case can go to trial without fear of any perversion of justice,
even on the retail level; if he does, throw out the case. If this solution
seems ridiculous, it is no more so than that used in the Ahkns case,
where the court adopted an unsupportable rule to defeat the plaintiff
simply because the defendant mnoght have insurance, and the plaintiff
or defendant or both might lie, and the jury m=ght believe them.
Actually there is no need for these alarums and excursions, these
curious cases laying down spurious rules. A problem can scarcely be
emergent which has plagued us for seventeen years. We are not alone
in our difficulties; Washington is merely one of twenty-six states which
adopted a guest statute in some form in the years lying roughly between
1929 and 1940, the rash breaking out in its most acute form in the
first four years of that period." Presumably all of these were sponsored
but for two loaves of stale bread which were to be used for chicken feed. It was held
to be a jury issue, which the plaintiff won, Justice Hill dissenting without opinion.
Whether or not the facts were substantial enuogh to go to the jury on the "payment"
issue may very well be a matter of opinion, but surely the facts are no stronger, the
danger of collusion or wholesale perversion of justice no greater, than in the Akins
case, unless one takes the somewhat remarkable position that the demurrer in the latter
case, presumably filed by the hypothetical insurer, itself indicates collusion.
Is Supra note 1 at p. 739.
14 ALA. CODE 1940 Tit. 36 § 95, PoPE's DIGEST OF ARx. STAT. 1937 §§ 1302-04,
CAL. VE33ICLE CODE 1935, § 403, COLO. STAT. ANN. 1935, c. 16 § 371, DEL. REv. CODE
1935, § 5713, FLA. STAT. 1941, § 320.59; IDAHO ANN. CODE 1932, §§ 48-901, 48-902,
ILL. REy. STAT. 1947, c. 95r/ § 58a, BURNS IND. ANN. STAT. 1938, § 47-1021, IOWA
CODE 1939, § 5037.10; KAN. GEN. STAT. 1935, § 8-122b; MIcH. Comp. LAws 1929,
§ 4648, MONT. REy. CODES 1935, §§ 1748.1-1748.4, NEB. REv. STAT. 1935, § 39174,
NEy. LAWS 1933, c. 34, N. M. ST. ANN. 1941, § 68-1001, N. D. REv. CODE 1943,
§ 39:1501, THocr0moRToN'S OHIO CODE 1936, § 6308-6, ORE. Comp. L. ANN. 1940,§ 115.1001, S. C. CODE 1932, § 5908, S. D. CODE 1939, § 44.0362, VENON's TEXAS
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by the insurance lobby, though that is neither here nor there; it is
simply an unfortunate truth that no legislation is enacted without the
backing of some interested and organized body These statutes vary m
their terms, since what one legislature could be induced to adopt would
not necessarily be stomached by another; it is perhaps a matter for
congratulation to our local lobby that our statute is the most stringent
of the lot in requiring intentional injury as the basis for recovery The
reasons for, the intent of, the purposes, the public policy behind these
statutes-however one chooses to put it-were of course never ex-
pressed by their makers, but the courts supplied a variety of them,
ranging from the contradictory extremes of striking at the vice of
ingratitude to the prevention of collusive suits in fraud of insurers.
Our own court listed four purposes which put the statute within the
police power of the legislature: to reduce the number of reckless driv-
ers, to encourage careful drivers to invite guests to ride with them, to
make highways safer for all concerned, and to reduce (one cannot in
conscience say prevent) the number of collusive suits in fraud of
insurers." For reasons which are surely obvious, only one item of this
listing has survived, does that one, then, justify the result in the
Akins case, or, to use the words of Justice Hill in his concurring
opinion, make the reason for it "crystal clear"?
Putting it somewhat bluntly, the answer is no. To take these cases
from the jury gives a protection which the hypothetical insurance
carrier does not need, is not entitled to, and which certainly is not
given by the statute itself. The very fact that the statute operates to
bar only "invited guests and licensees without payment for such trans-
portation" makes it, to borrow a phrase, crystal clear that persons not
within this category are free to recover for ordinary negligence, and
there is nothing to indicate that the ordinary means of classification-
that is to say, the jury-should not be used to determine which is
which. It is a mistake to think of these cases as being a battle between
Good and Evil, between Justice and Injustice; it is even a mistake to
think of them as a fight between a helpless and put-upon insurer and a
wily perjurer, with an eager and venal jury at hand to leap in and dirk
the defendant at the first opportunity with a false verdict. These cases
are simply a matter of deciding, by ordinary processes and with blood
pressure and temperature perfectly normal, whether the particular
STAT. 1948, § 6701b, UTAH ANN. CODE 1943, 57-11-7, VT. PUB. LAWS 1933, § 5113,
MICHIE'S VA. CODE 1942, § 2154-232, Wyo. Comp. STAT. 1945, § 60:1201.
- Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 155, 53 P.(2d) 615 (1936).
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plaintiff, under the particular facts of the particular case, falls within
or without the statutory definition. The court has developed various
devices to aid in that decision, and, intelligently applied, they can be
made to work very well indeed. The Fuller rule"0 as to what constitutes
"payment" will handle every case involving such a problem when
wielded properly by a courageous trial judge; joint adventure seems
finally to be under control, if the court will stick with the requirements
of the Poutre case. And as to the problem with which we started,
there is no basis in authority, in the statute, and above all in reason for
the involuntary guest of the Akins case, and the sooner that synthetic
monster is destroyed the better."8
16 Supra, note 11.
17 Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wn. (2d) 561, 143 P. (2d) 554 (1943) The court imposes
the requirement, in the nonbusiness joint adventure, that equal right of control be
established as a matter of fact by proving a contract which by its terms specifically
provides for the right of control. The case is extensively discussed in 24 WAsH. L.
Rxv. 118-121 (1949).
Is Other discussions of the Akins case may be found in 63 H. v. L. R1v. b28
(1950), and 3 VAND. L. REv. 149 (1949).
